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TOWARD INCREASED JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: THE POLITICAL ROLE OF 
THE SUPREME COURT. By Arthur Selwyn Miller. Westport, Conn.: 
Greenwood Press. 1982. Pp. xii, 365. $29.95. 
The United States has pursued a path characterized by prosperity 
and power; having reached the end of that path, only darkness and 
uncertainty lie ahead. The choice is an easy one. We, as a nation, 
may continue along our current path· and plunge head first into the 
abyss or we may take a step backward and survive, albeit more sim-
ply. As the age of scarcity approaches, Americans need a leader with 
the courage and vision to divert them from their current suicidal 
course. In his book, Toward Increased Judicial Activism: The Polit-
ical Role of the Supreme Court, Arthur Selwyn Miller1 suggests that 
the Supreme Court of the United States can and should become that 
leader. 
Professor Miller proceeds from the premise that the United 
States is in a state of transition. The Age of Abundance that marked 
the post-war era is being replaced by an Age of Scarcity in which 
"Americans and others now confront not a crisis, but a crisis crises 
- a climacteric - unique in modem and probably in all history" (p. 
184). As the ecological trap closes, Miller argues, there is an urgent 
need for a national leader with the strength and wisdom to preserve 
human dignity. The author contends that because the political 
branches of government have become prisoners of special interest 
groups, neither Congress nor the President can fulfill this leadership 
role (p. 259). While pluralism was possible, perhaps even beneficial, 
in an era of economic growth, its natural tendency toward "a series 
of cobbled-up compromises" now undermines the kind of moral and 
ethical consensus needed in an age of scarcity (p. 260). Thus, Miller 
properly concludes that pluralism has created "a growing paralysis" 
and has become "intellectually untenable" (p. 159). 
Because the political branches cannot meet the challenges that lie 
ahead, the author suggests that the Supreme Court is the only alter-
native (p. 317). His plea is for an activist Court, with the qualifica-
tion that such activism is desirable only "if it furthers the attainment 
of human dignity" (p. 9). To propose that the Court immerse itself 
more deeply in politics is not to advocate a radical transformation in 
its role, according to Miller. He persuasively demonstrates that 
throughout American history, the Supreme Court, rather than sim-
I. The author is Professor Emeritus of Law at George Washington University and Leo 
Goodwin, Sr., Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law at Nova University's Center for the 
Study of Law. Professor Miller is also the author of a recent work entitled DEMOCRATIC D1c-
TATORSHIP: THE EMERGENT CONSTITUTION OF CONTROL (1981). 
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ply interpreting the law, has, in fact, created it, together with associ-
ated national public policy (pp. 38-39). As an institution of the 
"Establishment," the Court has historically made policy decisions 
that have consistently benefitted the propertied classes (p. 43). These 
policy decisions have, the author argues, been concealed beneath a 
myth of judicial impartiality that has added an unquestioned legiti-
macy to the Court's rulings. 
As conditions have changed in American society, the Supreme 
Court has, according to Miller, demonstrated its political dexterity 
by adapting constitutional doctrine to meet those changes. In this 
regard, he argues that the Supreme Court established a Constitution 
of Powers (as opposed to a Constitution of Quasi-Limitations) in the 
post-World War II era so that it could make the kind of enlightened 
affirmative decisions necessary to help preserve the status quo by 
mollifying discontent (p. 267). Because the Court has historically 
acted as a quasi-legislative branch of government, Miller concludes 
that the Court ought to shed its traditional mystique; it should admit 
and expand the policymaking role of the Court. 
Having demonstrated that the Court is in fact a political organ 
that has the power to make policy decisions, Miller concludes that 
the Court is ideally suited to fit the role of "authoritative spokesman 
for national values" (p. 258). First, as an independent branch, the 
Court is insulated from the interest group pressures that have para-
lyzed the Presidency and the Legislature. Perhaps more importantly, 
however, the Constitution has historically been viewed as "a reli-
gious instrument" (p. 221) and the Supreme Court the divine inter-
preter of that instrument (p. 224). In short, the Constitution and the 
Court fulfill an important religious need in American Society. With 
such a religious following, the modem Supreme Court can function 
as an American version of Plato's "philosopher-rulers" (p. 230). 
Thus, the Supreme Court, Miller contends, is the ideal institution to 
guide the nation through the tumultuous times that lie ahead. 
As a description of the historical role of the Supreme Court and 
the present condition of American politics, the author's analysis is 
quite persuasive. This description, however, adds very little to the 
current state of knowledge. For more than half a century, legal real-
ists have maintained that the judiciary is guided more by personal 
and class biases than by the mythical rule oflaw.2 Nor is there any-
thing particularly new or original in the idea that government action 
has been crippled in recent years by the pluralist nature of American 
politics. Finally, commentators on political science and ecology 
have already recognized that democracy as we now know it probably 
2. See, e.g., Arnold, Professor Hart's Theology, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1298 (1960); Dahl, Deci-
sion-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 
(1957); Forrester, Are We Ready far Truth in Judging?, 63 A.B.A. J. 1212 (1977). 
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cannot survive the coming Age of Scarcity. Indeed, William Ophuls 
has argued that as the overcrowded world approaches its ecological 
limits, the polity should be run by an elite class of Platonic philoso-
pher-kings. 3 
What is original about Miller's work is the suggestion that the 
Supreme Court can and should assume the role of Platonic guardian. 
Miller's argument is that the Court's decisions should be guided not 
only by the desire to assure procedural fairness,4 but also by the sub-
stantive interest in assuring the preservation of human dignity. 
Given the present composition of the Court, the author admits that 
such enlightened leadership is inconceivable. His plea, instead, is for 
a new Court with "the capacity to see what is right and the courage 
to state it." "If that demand is a call for a group of superhumans, as 
perhaps it is," Miller says, "so be it" (p. 294). 
At this point, Miller's argument is really no argument at all. 
Who would question the desirability of government by such enlight-
ened Platonic guardians, whether they occupied the Judiciary, the 
Congress, the Presidency or any other organ of government? But to 
call for national leadership by a group of superhumans is really to 
beg the question. It is for the very reason that we are unable to iden-
tify such superior beings that power must be balanced between com-
peting branches of government. The real issue, given the fallibility of 
humankind, is how best to distribute power among the various or-
gans of government. It is absurd to assume first that one organ is 
virtually perfect and then to conclude that it should be all-powerful. 
Miller indicates that because judges are not as susceptible to in-
terest group pressures (pp. 259-60), and because of the judiciary's 
inherent position of ethical leadership, they are more likely to make 
enlightened decisions in the public interest. But as he also points out, 
the judges themselves are chosen from a class of narrow-minded 
lawyers who have a vested interest in preserving the status of the 
established elite (p. 281). Historically, judges have failed to tran-
scend the values of the class from which they are drawn and the 
author suggests no selection process that would remedy this state of 
affairs. In a similar vein, Miller contends that the adversarial pro-
cess is an inadequate method of providing the information with 
which judges can make policy, but again he posits no alternative (p. 
281). 
Miller goes to great lengths to document the wide scope of judi-
cial power. He fails to realize, however, that his proposal for activ-
ism unleashed would destroy the very foundation of the Court's 
3. W. OPHULS, ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY 160 (1977). 
4. For the view that the primary function of the Court is to assure that democratic proce-
dures are correctly followed, see J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). 
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authority. Stripped of the mystique that has led the public to view 
the Supreme Court as a modem Delphic oracle, the Court's deci-
sions would be revealed as nothing more than the political judgment 
of a group of all too fallible individuals. With the myth of judicial 
impartiality shattered, the Court would lose its religious following 
and with it the public respect upon which the judiciary thrives. In-
deed, the Court has attempted to maintain its power by being careful 
not to immerse itself too deeply in political disputes. As Miller him-
self admits, the Supreme Court must ultimately "rely on the good-
will of others, at all levels of government, to translate [its] standards 
into operational reality" (p. 271). Thus, if the justices attempt to im-
pose controversial public policy decrees upon an unwilling President 
and a recalcitrant Congress, the Court will soon find its jurisdiction 
substantially diminished and its orders unenforced. 
The author suggests that we need not concern ourselves with the 
untrammeled abuse of judicial power because the decisions of the 
Court will be limited by the concept of human dignity. Again, this 
begs the question, for Miller never suggests a selection process for 
choosing the Platonic guard. Without a guarantee of a near-perfect 
Court (which Miller cannot provide), the tyrannical abuse of power 
(if, indeed, such power could ever be obtained in the first place) 
would be inevitable. 
In an attempt to preempt these criticisms, the author warns that 
those who disagree must not label their argument as an attack upon 
"the dangers of judicial activism, anytime, anywhere, against any 
power, and toward any end" (p. 303). In a sense, Miller is right. The 
danger of judicial tyranny would not exist if it were possible to se-
cure the leadership of an enlightened judiciary relentlessly striving to 
preserve human dignity. Many of those most wholeheartedly com-
mitted to notions of judicial restraint would gladly sacrifice the pres-
ent system of democratic rule for such godlike leadership. The 
problem is that Miller's ideal court is nothing more than an ideal. In 
the final analysis, one must respect Professor Miller for his coura-
geous attempt to provide a solution to the crises that Americans will 
confront as they approach the Age of Scarcity. Unfortunately, 
neither his criticism of the American political system nor his descrip-
tion of the impending watershed is unique in any way, and the solu-
tion he offers is not a solution at all. 
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THE LAW GIVETH . . . LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE .ABORTION CONTRO-
VERSY. By Barbara Milbauer in collaboration with Bert N. Obrentz. 
New York: Atheneum. 1983. Pp. xiii, 363. $21.95. 
To the nonlawyer, Barbara Milbauer's1 book The Law Giveth 
may be an original and valuable contribution to the debate over 
abortion because it focuses on the legal aspects of the controversy. 
To the lawyer, the book may be equally original and valuable be-
cause it goes beyond the legal aspects of abortion2 to look at the 
development of the law on abortion, the happenstance nature of how 
legal rights are gained and lost, and most importantly, the lives of 
the women affected by abortion laws. 
Milbauer begins her compendium of interviews, cases, historical 
material, and social analysis with an account of the woman called 
"Jane Roe," a Texan who agreed to let her case be the vehicle for 
challenging state prohibitions on abortion. Reading Justice Black-
mun's opinion in Roe v. Wade 3 affords an understanding of the legal 
response to the problem of unwanted pregnancy. Reading Jane 
Roe's story yields an understanding of the human side of the prob-
lem. Hardly anyone will be able to read dispassionately of how 
Jane, divorced and poor, lost custody of her only daughter through 
subterfuge to her mother, was raped by three men on a gravel road 
in Georgia, and returned to Texas to find she had no choice but to 
give birth to and give up a second child. Milbauer recounts inter-
views with other women as well, including Mary Doe, the plaintiff in 
.Doe v. Bolten ,4 the companion case to Roe, and the attorneys for 
these plaintiffs. She also gives short biographies of the major actors 
of the past - notably Margaret Sanger, who in the first half of this 
century almost single-handedly challenged the federal "obscenity" 
ban on birth control information and founded Planned Parenthood. 
Milbauer also indulges the reader with historical material tend-
ing to show that anti-abortion laws and other restrictions on wo-
men's rights were more often than not products of the vagaries of 
I. Milbauer is a 1980 graduate of New York Law School. She has authored several books 
including DRUG ABUSE AND ADDICTION (1970). Her collaborator, Bert N. Obrentz, is also a 
1980 graduate of New York Law School and is associated with the International Ladies Gar-
ment Worker's Union. 
2. The legal literature on abortion is abundant. For a sampling of discussions of the major 
issues, see Appleton, Beyond the Limits of Reproductive Choice: The Contributions of the Abor-
tion-Funding Cases to Fundamental-Rights Analysis and lo the Welfare-Rights Thesis, 81 
CoLUM. L. REv. 721 (1981) (a criticism of the holding in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 
(1980)); Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973) 
(the seminal criticism of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)); Perry,Abortion, the Public Morals, 
and the Police Power: The Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process, 23 UCLA L. REv. 689 
(1976) (defending the Roe result); Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1569 
(1979) Gustifying the Roe result with an equal protection argument). 
3. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
4. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
